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Media outlets and their moguls: why concentrated individual or family ownership is bad for editorial independence 1 Introduction
In 1981, the Thompson Organisation had to decide to whom to sell its flagship titles, the Times and Sunday Times. The group had two concerns -that the future of both papers be guaranteed, and that their independence from proprietorial influence be preserved. Editorial independence had been an issue when the Thompson Organisation initially acquired the newspapers, and remained salient, especially given the Sunday Times' free-wheeling investigative journalism (Shawcross, 1997, 122) . One question for those directing the sale was whether 'youthful' and 'vigorous' Australian Rupert Murdoch could guarantee that independence. This group had to bear in mind that Murdoch's company, News
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary News International, was ultimately controlled by the Murdoch family, who had a stake of around 46% through their investment vehicle Cruden Investments (Stevenson, 1985) . Accordingly, when the group decided to accept Murdoch's bid, it imposed several conditions, not least that the board of the newspaper have a majority of independent directors who would have to approve the appointment of editors (Leveson, 2011, 104-105) .
Concerns over editorial independence of a different sort were expressed by journalists in Central and Eastern Europe during the first wave of take-overs of print and broadcast titles by transnational media companies. Reactions "displayed a mixture of hopes and concerns" (Stetka, 2012, 438) . The European Federation of Journalists warned that the aggressive commercialism of these corporations risked undermining journalistic standards, presumably including editorial independence (Stetka, 2012, 439) . This concern was not due to the presence of a strong individual ownership interest -a Rupert Murdoch or a Silvio Berlusconi. Rather, it was due to a fear that dispersed corporate ownership could still pose a threat to editorial independence.
Whilst the Thompson Organisation and Central and Eastern European
journalists faced very different choices, they shared a common interest in protecting editorial independence. Their choices were no doubt influenced by the character of the respective parties, perhaps even their 'alarming charm' (Evans, 1983, 124) . For academics and policy-makers, however, important questions exist independently of the charm or suasion exercised by individuals.
Considering the following structural characteristics, which group had greater reason to be concerned about owner influence -the Thompson group, faced with a company (News Corporation) already operating in the UK market, with a single dominant individual ownership interest (Rupert Murdoch)? Or journalists in Central and Eastern Europe, faced with foreign-owned companies making their first foray in emerging markets, with multiple foreign owners of different types?
Strangely, the academic literature offers no easy answer to this question, despite agreement that the important question was whether or not owner influence was "due to the characteristics of individual owners and managers or to some systematic impact inherent in the different types of ownership and management" (Lacy, 1991, 38) . Lack of an easy answer is not due to inattention to questions of ownership: in many instances we know who owns the media (for a given understanding of ownership), either within a single country (Noam, 2009) or across many countries (Djankov et al., 2003) . Nor is it due to inattention to influences on journalism, as this is currently an active area of research (Hanitzsch and Mellado, 2011) . Rather, it is due to the difficulty of collecting sufficient, and sufficiently varied, data on both influence and ownership structure. This is particularly difficult when interest lies not just in identifying a single 'type' of owner ('transnational corporation' or 'media tycoon'), but in identifying the shares of different ownership interests, and the concentration thereof. Such research requires much tedious work in analyzing annual company reports. Nevertheless, investigation in this level of detail is necessary, because it is the kind of detail with which regulators must regularly operate, as recent cases in the UK have shown (Ofcom, 2010 
Literature
The 'problem' of owner influence is not unique to media companies. Tensions between shareholders and corporate executives are almost as well known as tensions between media owners and their editors. Because this problem is shared
with other companies, I analyze owner influence over media outlets by borrowing from the literature on industrial organisation. Before I can summarize that literature, I first describe some conceptual issues relating to ownership and influence. Having clarified these concepts, I then move on to discussing the findings of the existing media studies literature on ownership and influence, before introducing the literature on industrial organisation.
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine.
What is ownership?
The considerable literature on media ownership 2 has often faced one serious problem in understanding ownership, namely a problem of aggregating ownership across multiple media outlets operating in different media. Crossownership of print and broadcast outlets makes it difficult to find a common denominator in terms of audience share or circulation. Public media make it difficult to find a common denominator in terms of revenue. This problem of aggregation masks a more fundamental problem of identifying particular ownership interests. One option is to suggest that each media outlet has a single ultimate ownership interest. This is the approach taken by Djankov et al. (2003) , who proceed according to the following algorithm: In these cases, it is difficult to say that this ultimate owner 'owns' the relevant media outlet. It also leaves the question of the concentration of ownership unanalysed.
What is owner influence?
The influence exerted by owners on media workers (journalists, editors and managers) is one of many sources of influence. Of the six domains proposed by Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011, 406-407) influence designed to shift the political and social tenor of the title's coverage.
This kind of influence is easiest to identify when exercised overtly, through company memos, irate phone calls, or interference in hiring and dismissal (Bagdikian, 2004, 15-16) ; but this visible face of power is rarely the most consequential (Lukes, 1974) , and influential owners rarely have to make their wishes known in order to have their will done. This raises the difficult issue of identifying owner influence empirically. Although a large body of work attempts to identify the consequences of owner influence for differences in output (Gaziano, 1989; DellaVigna and Kennedy, 2011) , in this article I evaluate owner influence through an expert survey. Not only is inference through content analysis tricky, it is also conceptually flawed, for influence may not translate to differences in output where equal and opposing influences exist. Consequently, reliance on perceptual data is a necessary step.
What does the literature say?
There is a considerable literature on media ownership. However, much of this literature has examined concentration of ownership at the level of the media market, rather than concentration of ownership within a given media outlet.
Even articles which do examine the ownership of specific outlets tend to ignore aspects of within-outlet ownership concentration (Djankov et al., 2003) . There is scholarship on particular types of ownership. A rich vein of literature examines the consequences (particularly consequences for news and current affairs output) of ownership by media tycoons or moguls (Tunstall and Palmer, 1991; Stetka, 2012) , by political parties (Hadenius 1983 , Hamilton 2004 , by the state (Besley and Prat, 2006; Curran et al., 2009) , and by multinational corporations (Stetka, 2012) . However, much of this literature is interested in the effects of aggregate patterns of ownership on aggregate outcomes, and at least some interesting characteristics of ownership (such as the concentration of ownership within an individual outlet) cannot be aggregated to a system level. What is needed, therefore, is broader theoretical canvas which can bring together discussions of ownership concentration and discussions of different ownership types. I suggest that the literature on the industrial organisation of the media offers that broader canvas.
What does the industrial organisation literature say?
The literature on industrial organisation offers two separate insights into the extent of owner influence over media outlets. The first insight comes from work following Berle and Means (1932) , and which identifies levels of concentration of ownership as a key factor in determining owners' influence. A second insight comes from the literature on the benefits of ownership, and in particular the nonpecuniary benefits. Berle and Means (1932) noted the increasing dispersion of stock ownership in modern corporations, and argued that this, together with the spread of nonvoting shares, had led to a lack of shareholder control over executives. Lack of control was undesirable because executives pursued policies which maximized their own income at the expense of shareholders' return on investment. Shareholding in media companies is much more concentrated than shareholding in other companies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . It would therefore seem that owners of media companies can exercise much more control than other owners. Insofar as that control is exercised to prevent media managers from shirking or selfdealing, this is beneficial; but insofar as that control is exercised in order to instil a particular editorial line in a media outlet, the 'problem' of media ownership is precisely the opposite of the problem identified by Berle and Means -there is too much, rather than too little control.
Bearle-Means style arguments have been repeatedly advanced in the field of the media by David Demers. Demers (1999) argues that corporate control of newspaper production in the United States, far from dampening editorial vigour, actually results in an increase in independent-minded journalism, as newspaper managers (i.e., editors) shirk the control of their dispersed corporate principals.
Since Demers only includes 'ownership structure' as one of five dimensions of 'corporate newspaper structure', it is not possible to test directly the effects of concentration of ownership (Demers and Merskin, 2000, 115-116) ).
Nevertheless, we can consider concentration of ownership to act as an important factor intervening between (normally) independently-minded editors and owners who may have other interests.
In Demers' work, and indeed in most work in industrial organisation, the "standard assumption … is that owners want the company to maximize… shareholder value. Although this assumption may be sufficient for many purposes, it is strictly speaking only an approximation of the more general idea that owners (like managers) may be expected to maximize their utility, which may depend on other factors" (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, 692) . Certainly, for many standard financial indicators companies predominantly owned by some types of ownership interests (natural persons or families) enjoy different outcomes to companies predominantly owned by other types (institutional investors, banks) (ibid). In the media, part of an explanation for this difference derives from the amenity potential of ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985, 1161) define amenity potential as a 'nonpecuniary income associated with the provision of leadership and with the ability to deploy resources to suit one's personal preferences', and argue that it is particularly present in the media.
Obvious instances of amenity potential include the potential to rub shoulders 
Theory
These insights can help us make predictions about levels of owner influence over media outlets. Specifically, we may model actual levels of owner influence as if they were the result of a voting game, where owners with divergent preferences over the ideal level of owner influence vote on proposals made by the management of the media outlet. The key intuition is that, just as in the BearleMeans account, dispersed shareholders find it difficult to vote down management proposals for high levels of executive remuneration, dispersed
shareholders also find it difficult to agree on a significant departure from management-proposed low levels of owner influence. High levels of influence are possible, where owners have preferences over influence that are skewed to the high-influence end of the spectrum, or where ownership is concentrated, but absent these two features the management will get its way. We can extract one further hypothesis from the theory if we draw certain inferences from share-holdings in multiple outlets. One feature of the 'amenity potential' of media outlet ownership is that it cannot easily be transferred between countries. Silvio Berlusconi enjoyed huge political influence in Italy;
but his efforts to replicate that success in France and (to a lesser extent) Spain largely failed. Consequently, owners who hold ownership interests in multiple countries are, on balance, likely to be more interested in maximizing return on investment than they are in the amenity potential of media ownership.
Conversely, owners who hold multiple ownership interests in the same country are, on balance, more likely to be interested in the amenity potential of media ownership than they are in maximizing return by investing over a range of media markets. There is no necessary contradiction between maximizing one's return on investment and exercising influence (see Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) .
However, at least when considering sequential and separate investments, it would seem unusual if profit-maximizing owners were to seek out investment opportunities and conclude that more than one of the best opportunities lay in the same media market.
This theory could enable us to make point predictions if we knew the preferences of ownership interests directly. Unfortunately, we do not know this, and therefore must make predictions which are based on the effect of single 
H 2 The greater the share of voting power within an outlet held by individuals and families compared to companies and, the greater the degree of owner influence
This relates to earlier assumptions about the amenity potential of ownership being accessible only to individuals and families rather than corporate agents. To the extent that these assumptions are false, and corporate interests appreciate acting as power-brokers (as Fiat did with its ownership of La Stampa), then this hypothesis will not be born out.
The repeat-player hypotheses claim that
H 3 The greater the share of voting power held by ownership interests which have other ownership interests in the same country, the greater the degree of owner influence

H 4 The greater the share of voting power held by ownership interests which have ownership interests in other different media markets, the lower the degree of owner influence
This relates to earlier assumptions about the amenity potential of ownership being more difficult to enjoy in two countries simultaneously than the return on investment on two investments in different countries.
Data and modelling choices
This article draws on two sources of data: data concerning the ownership structure of different outlets, and expert judgments concerning the degree of ownership influence over each outlet.
Ownership structure
Data on the ownership of the outlets in the 32 media markets in the study as of As far as possible, we attempted to identify either at least six ownership interests, or at least a cumulative total of 80% of ownership in the company. On average, 88.53% of ownership was identified in the 211 outlets. For 59 outlets it was not possible to find information on 80% of ownership: in most of these cases, ownership is known to be widely dispersed through publicly traded shares. Because we are interested in corporate control rather than just corporate ownership, I calculated the Banzhaf scores for each ownership interest (Banzhaf, 1964) . The Banzhaf score for a given ownership interest is the percentage of winning coalitions of ownership interests (under some decision making rule) which would cease to be winning if actor i voted differently. Here, we assume that the decision-making rule is a majority rule, and that 50% + 1 of votes are necessary to pass motions. Where we were unable to locate information on 100%
of the ownership of a media outlet, we assume that remaining ownership stakes are infinitesimally small and can be ignored; the Banzhaf index can then be calculated as if the identified ownership shares representing 100% of the voting stock.
[ Figure 1 about here] 
Owner influence
The data on owner influence come from a 2010 survey of experts in the media systems of 32 European media markets conducted by Popescu et al. (2012) .
Experts were asked to indicate their agreement with a series of statements concerning the top media outlets, typically but not always the public broadcaster, the top three newspapers, and the top three commercial television stations. Responses were on a scale from zero (low levels of influence) to ten (high levels). The reliability of the mean of expert judgements is high: the Steenbergen-Marks reliability coefficient (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007) is 0.93.
The average across all outlets is 6.11, but this once again masks significant differences between media markets (F(31, 179) = 15.12, p ≈ 0). Owner influence is on average lowest in the Netherlands (2.01), Denmark (2.46) and Norway (3.19), and highest in Greece (8.1), Cyprus (8.62) and Malta (9.2). These country differences match normal assessments of press freedom in each of these countries.
[ Table 1 about here]
Other variables
I also gathered data on the degree of concentration in the market, understood as the concentration of audience shares (press: readership) amongst different media groups, as calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration. I include this in the models that follow because of the possibility that owners might be less likely to exercise influence where the market is competitive and potential competitors can easily attract readers or viewers who, for whatever reason, are dissatisfied by the type of coverage which results when owners intervene.
I also recorded whether each outlet was a print or broadcast outlet. I include this in the models that follow because of the possibility that owners in broadcast media might be less able to exercise influence due to the common requirement in European media systems that broadcast media follow norms of impartiality or fairness. Table 1 shows summary statistics for all of the numerical variables used in the models that follow.
Modelling choices
To account for the fact that outlets are nested within countries, I estimate a multilevel model using a linear regression model with a random country intercept.
For technical reasons, separate variables cannot be included for all ownership types, and so one type must be chosen as a reference category.
Consequently, I use company ownership as a reference category; the coefficients for other types of ownership therefore represent the change from company ownership. Table 2 shows the results of two models, one with variables relating to the concentration, identity, and repeat-player hypotheses, and one with additional controls for market concentration and medium. Random intercepts are not
Results
shown, but are available on request. Three measures of fit are reported -the loglikelihood, the Akaike Information Criterion, and the Bayesian Information
Criterion. Smaller values indicate better fit, leading us to prefer the more parsimonious model.
[ Table 2 Second, the identity hypothesis is also confirmed. There is likely to be significantly more owner influence in outlets that are owned by individuals and families than in outlets owned by companies. This effect is stronger for individuals than for families, perhaps reflecting coordination problems within families that are analogous to the coordination problems within the firm. The substantive magnitude of this effect is moderate. Each coefficient represents the change from 100% voting power (which means at least 50% of ownership) being held by a single company or a group of companies, to 100% voting power held by a single individual or a group of individuals, though obviously some changes in ownership structure involving individuals or companies acquiring smaller voting shares. Finally, the repeat-player hypothesis is also confirmed. Ownership groups which are national repeat-players are significantly more likely, and ownership groups which are international repeat-players significantly less likely, to exercise owner influence, compared to the reference category (a ownership group which possesses a single title or channel). Since these are dummy variables, the coefficients simply measure the effect of a change of type.
These findings are robust to the inclusion of controls for the degree of market concentration, and a dummy for whether or not the media outlet in question is a print or broadcast outlet. Contrary to expectations, owner influence is significantly higher in broadcast outlets.
Conclusion
In this article, I have demonstrated that higher levels of ownership concentration are associated with higher levels of owner influence over media outlets, and that owner is influence is greater where voting power within the company is concentrated in the hands of individuals and families rather than companies. I have also shown that ownership groups which own multiple titles on the national level only are more likely to exercise owner influence, whereas groups which spread their ownership across titles in different countries are less likely to exercise such influence.
What are the consequences of these findings for the broader literature? I suggest that my findings precede much of the literature on the critical political economy of the media. That literature generally agrees on two premises: corporatization, the claim that ownership of media companies by (multinational) corporations is increasingly common (Williams, 1981, 51; Golding and Murdock 1996, 64) , and commodification, the claim that media `products' are increasingly being treated as having no value other than exchange value, and are thus no different to products in other markets. It has either left unchallenged or ignored the standard assumption in micro-economics that corporations' behaviour can be described as if they were profit-maximizing, or, has argued that profit-maximizing behaviour is constrained on the margins by the need to maintain hegemony.
My argument is that corporations may not be very good even at maximizing profit, because corporatization in many instances is exaggerated (in my sample, Third, insofar as minimizing owner influence is concerned, policy-makers should not erect higher barriers against ownership of media outlets by foreign operators (or more accurately, ownership groups which have other international titles but no other domestic title). These groups reduce owner influence, and the transition in Central and Eastern Europe from transnational to domestic ownership by well-connected individuals, identified by Stetka (2012) , has only resulted in an increase in the extent to which any individual outlet's editorial line can be traced back to the interests of its owner.
The qualification in this last recommendation is important. Minimizing owner influence is rarely the only, or even the major, concern when regulating the media. Whilst owner influence of the kind we discuss here is one type of non-pecuniary benefit, or amenity potential, of media ownership, there are other non-pecuniary benefits which are more socially beneficial. To return to the example with which this article started, one important factor in Rupert
Murdoch's successful acquisition of the Times and the Sunday Times was his desire, forcefully stated and by all accounts sincere, to maintain both papers as important and prestigious titles. The non-pecuniary benefit to Murdoch of maintaining both titles has led to considerable losses for News International (News Corporation's British subsidiary), which one estimate put at one million pounds weekly (Sabbagh, 2012) . If access to a wide range of titles is valuable in democracies, this is one non-pecuniary benefit which we might wish to encourage by concentrated individual ownership. 
